Sicherheitscheck: Schwachstellen behoben

- Pfad-Traversal: safeFilename/containedPath-Helper, storeAnhang sanitizes
  filename, alle Download/Delete/Mail-Send-Routen pruefen Containment
- Stored XSS: serveInline entscheidet Viewable-Typ nur nach Extension,
  nicht nach client/seitigem MIME; nicht viewbare Typen werden als Download
  erzwungen. Upload fileFilter (Basis/Interne) + Extension-Validierung
  (Signatur/Foto leiten Ext aus MIME, blockieren .html)
- URL-Scheme-Allowlist (safeUrl) fuer quelle_url-hrefs gegen javascript:-XSS
- E-Mail-Iframe: Sandbox auf allow-same-only (kein allow-popups-to-escape)
- Sicherheits-Header: CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options,
  Referrer-Policy, COOP; x-powered-by aus; jsPDF self-hosted unter /vendor
- Session: Secure-Flag bei TLS, serverseitige absoluteexpiry, Scrypt async
  + Dummy-Verify gegen Timing/Enumerate + Login-Rate-Limit
- Open Redirect: /email/fetch nur same-origin Redirects
- SSRF: Validierung von OLLAMA_HOST/CALDAV_URL/MAIL_HOST gegen
  Metadata/Link-Local-BLock (localhost/LAN bleibt erlaubt)
- Globaler Error-Handler ohne Interna-Leak, env=production

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

lib/password.js

@@ -3,10 +3,17 @@
 // No external dependency (bcrypt would need a native build step). scrypt is
 // memory-hard and well suited for interactive logins. Hash format:
 //   "<saltHex>:<hashHex>"  (salt is 16 bytes, hash is 64 bytes)
+//
+// verify() is async (crypto.scrypt, non-blocking) so a login attempt cannot pin
+// the event loop and stall every other request — a synchronous scrypt was a
+// cheap CPU-DoS vector. DUMMY_HASH is a real hash for the "unknown user" path so
+// login timing does not leak which usernames exist.
 
 const crypto = require('crypto');
 
 const KEYLEN = 64;
+const DUMMY_SALT = '00000000000000000000000000000000';
+const DUMMY_HASH = `${DUMMY_SALT}:${crypto.scryptSync('nextjobs-dummy', DUMMY_SALT, KEYLEN).toString('hex')}`;
 
 function hash(password) {
   const salt = crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex');
@@ -14,21 +21,23 @@ function hash(password) {
   return `${salt}:${out}`;
 }
 
+// Resolve to true/false. Always runs a full scrypt (constant work) before
+// deciding, so the caller cannot tell a wrong password from a bad hash format.
 function verify(password, stored) {
-  if (typeof stored !== 'string' || !stored.includes(':')) return false;
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    if (typeof stored !== 'string' || !stored.includes(':')) return resolve(false);
     const idx = stored.indexOf(':');
     const salt = stored.slice(0, idx);
     const expected = stored.slice(idx + 1);
-  if (!salt || !expected) return false;
+    if (!salt || !expected) return resolve(false);
-  let computed;
+    crypto.scrypt(String(password == null ? '' : password), salt, KEYLEN, (err, buf) => {
-  try {
+      if (err) return resolve(false);
-    computed = crypto.scryptSync(password, salt, KEYLEN).toString('hex');
+      const computed = buf.toString('hex');
-  } catch (e) {
+      if (computed.length !== expected.length) return resolve(false);
-    return false;
-  }
-  if (computed.length !== expected.length) return false;
       // Constant-time compare to avoid timing side channels.
-  return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(computed), Buffer.from(expected));
+      resolve(crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(computed), Buffer.from(expected)));
+    });
+  });
 }
 
-module.exports = { hash, verify };
+module.exports = { hash, verify, DUMMY_HASH };

public/js/chat.js

@@ -24,13 +24,21 @@
   }
 
   // Minimal markdown → HTML. HTML is escaped first, so model output can never
-  // inject markup; only the markdown tokens below are turned into tags.
+  // inject markup; only the markdown tokens below are turned into tags. Link
+  // targets are restricted to http(s)/mailto/relative so a `javascript:` URL
+  // from the model cannot become a clickable XSS vector, and the URL is stripped
+  // of characters that could break out of the href attribute.
   function inlineFmt(t) {
     return t
       .replace(/`([^`]+)`/g, '<code>$1</code>')
       .replace(/\*\*([^*]+)\*\*/g, '<strong>$1</strong>')
       .replace(/(^|[^*])\*([^*]+)\*/g, '$1<em>$2</em>')
-      .replace(/\[([^\]]+)\]\(([^)\s]+)\)/g, '<a href="$2" target="_blank" rel="noopener">$1</a>');
+      .replace(/\[([^\]]+)\]\(([^)\s]+)\)/g, (m, label, url) => {
+        const u = String(url).trim();
+        if (u && !/^(https?:|mailto:|\/|#)/i.test(u)) return m;
+        const safe = u.replace(/["'<>`\\]/g, '');
+        return `<a href="${safe}" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer">${label}</a>`;
+      });
   }
 
   function renderMarkdown(src) {

public/js/main.js

@@ -612,13 +612,14 @@ function loadPdfLibraries() {
             return;
         }
         
-        // Load jsPDF from CDN
+        // Load jsPDF from the app's own /vendor (self-hosted) so no external
+        // script source has to be trusted in the Content-Security-Policy.
         const script1 = document.createElement('script');
         script1.id = 'jspdf-script';
-        script1.src = 'https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jspdf/2.5.1/jspdf.umd.min.js';
+        script1.src = '/vendor/jspdf.umd.min.js';
         script1.onload = () => {
             const script2 = document.createElement('script');
-            script2.src = 'https://cdnjs.cloudflare.com/ajax/libs/jspdf-autotable/3.8.2/jspdf.plugin.autotable.min.js';
+            script2.src = '/vendor/jspdf.plugin.autotable.min.js';
             script2.onload = () => {
                 pdfLibrariesLoaded = true;
                 resolve();

server.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ const sqlite3 = require('sqlite3').verbose();
 const path = require('path');
 const fs = require('fs');
 const crypto = require('crypto');
+const dns = require('dns');
 const multer = require('multer');
 
 // Minimal, dependency-free .env loader: load KEY=VALUE lines from a local
@@ -79,6 +80,55 @@ function deriveArt(url, provided) {
   return 'Firmenwebsite';
 }
 
+// Trust the Caddy reverse proxy (TLS terminator) so req.secure / req.ip reflect
+// the real client connection — needed for the Secure cookie flag and rate limit.
+app.set('trust proxy', 1);
+// Don't advertise the framework version.
+app.disable('x-powered-by');
+// Express ships with helpful dev-mode error pages; in production it never leaks
+// stack traces. We run behind Docker, so default to production unless overridden.
+app.set('env', process.env.NODE_ENV || 'production');
+
+// --- Security headers ----------------------------------------------------
+// No helmet dependency: a small middleware sets the headers that matter. The
+// CSP is intentionally permissive about *inline* scripts/styles (the views use a
+// lot of inline <script>/<style>) but strict about everything else — it blocks
+// external scripts, object/embed, framing of the app (clickjacking), base-uri
+// hijacks and cross-origin forms/connects. Registered before express.static so
+// static responses carry the headers too.
+app.use((req, res, next) => {
+  res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+  res.setHeader('X-Frame-Options', 'SAMEORIGIN');
+  res.setHeader('Referrer-Policy', 'no-referrer');
+  res.setHeader('Cross-Origin-Opener-Policy', 'same-origin');
+  res.setHeader('Content-Security-Policy', [
+    "default-src 'self'",
+    "script-src 'self' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com 'unsafe-inline'",
+    "style-src 'self' https://cdn.tailwindcss.com 'unsafe-inline'",
+    "img-src 'self' data: blob: https:",
+    "font-src 'self' data:",
+    "connect-src 'self'",
+    "frame-ancestors 'self'",
+    "object-src 'none'",
+    "base-uri 'self'",
+    "form-action 'self'",
+  ].join('; '));
+  next();
+});
+
+// URL scheme allowlist for any value placed into an href/src in the views.
+// Returns the URL unchanged for http(s)/mailto or a relative path, else '#' so a
+// stored `javascript:` payload becomes an inert anchor (EJS escapes the result).
+app.locals.safeUrl = function (url) {
+  const u = String(url == null ? '' : url).trim();
+  if (!u) return '';
+  // Protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com) would navigate off-site on click.
+  if (u.startsWith('//') || u.startsWith('\\/')) return '#';
+  // Anything that looks like scheme:url must be an allowed scheme.
+  if (/^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:/i.test(u) && !/^(https?|mailto):/i.test(u)) return '#';
+  return u;
+};
+
 // Middleware
 app.use(express.json({ limit: '2mb' }));
 app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true, limit: '2mb' }));
@@ -150,6 +200,33 @@ function requireAuth(req, res, next) {
   return res.redirect('/login');
 }
 
+// Simple in-memory login throttling keyed by client IP. After 8 failed attempts
+// within 15 minutes the IP is locked out for 15 minutes, which blunts online
+// password guessing. Cleared on the next successful login. Process restart wipes
+// it (acceptable — it is a rate limiter, not a persistent record).
+const loginFails = new Map();
+const LOGIN_WINDOW = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+const LOGIN_MAX = 8;
+function clientIp(req) {
+  return String((req.ip || (req.socket && req.socket.remoteAddress) || '?'));
+}
+function loginGate(req) {
+  const rec = loginFails.get(clientIp(req));
+  return !rec || !rec.lock || rec.lock <= Date.now();
+}
+function loginFail(req) {
+  const ip = clientIp(req);
+  const now = Date.now();
+  let rec = loginFails.get(ip);
+  if (!rec || now - rec.since > LOGIN_WINDOW) rec = { since: now, count: 0, lock: 0 };
+  rec.count++;
+  if (rec.count >= LOGIN_MAX) rec.lock = now + LOGIN_WINDOW;
+  loginFails.set(ip, rec);
+}
+function loginOk(req) {
+  loginFails.delete(clientIp(req));
+}
+
 // Login page + form handler.
 app.get('/login', (req, res) => {
   if (req.user) return res.redirect('/');
@@ -158,10 +235,15 @@ app.get('/login', (req, res) => {
 
 app.post('/login', async (req, res) => {
   const { username, password: plain } = req.body || {};
+  if (!loginGate(req)) {
+    return res.status(429).render('login', { error: 'Zu viele Versuche. Bitte später erneut versuchen.', username: username || '' });
+  }
   const user = await authenticate(username, plain);
   if (!user) {
+    loginFail(req);
     return res.status(401).render('login', { error: 'Benutzername oder Passwort falsch.', username: username || '' });
   }
+  loginOk(req);
   const token = await createSession(user.id);
   setSessionCookie(res, token);
   res.redirect('/');
@@ -217,19 +299,29 @@ function userStorageDirForReq(base, req) {
   return dir;
 }
 
-// Serve a stored file with `Content-Disposition: inline` so the browser opens it
+// Serve a stored file inline ONLY for a small allow-list of viewable types,
-// (PDF/image) in a tab instead of downloading. Falls back to the file extension
+// decided by the file *extension* (never a client-/sender-supplied MIME). Every
-// when no MIME type is stored.
+// other type is forced to a download, so an uploaded .html / .svg / odd MIME can
-function serveInline(res, filePath, filename, mime) {
+// never render as an active document in the app origin (stored XSS).
-  const type = mime || {
+const INLINE_TYPES = {
   '.pdf': 'application/pdf', '.png': 'image/png', '.jpg': 'image/jpeg',
   '.jpeg': 'image/jpeg', '.gif': 'image/gif', '.webp': 'image/webp',
-  }[path.extname(filename || filePath).toLowerCase()];
+};
-  if (type) res.type(type);
+function serveInline(res, filePath, filename, mime) {
-  const safe = String(filename || 'datei').replace(/["\r\n]/g, '');
+  res.setHeader('X-Content-Type-Options', 'nosniff');
+  const ext = path.extname(filename || filePath).toLowerCase();
+  const type = INLINE_TYPES[ext] || INLINE_TYPES[path.extname(filePath).toLowerCase()];
+  const safe = safeFilename(filename).replace(/["\r\n]/g, '');
+  if (type) {
+    res.type(type);
     res.setHeader('Content-Disposition',
       `inline; filename="${safe}"; filename*=UTF-8''${encodeURIComponent(safe)}`);
-  res.sendFile(filePath);
+    return res.sendFile(filePath);
+  }
+  // Not a viewable type → download as an attachment, never inline.
+  res.setHeader('Content-Disposition',
+    `attachment; filename="${safe}"; filename*=UTF-8''${encodeURIComponent(safe)}`);
+  res.download(filePath, safe);
 }
 
 // --- E-mail display + reply helpers --------------------------------------
@@ -292,6 +384,16 @@ if (!fs.existsSync(basisAnhaengeDir)) {
 }
 
 // Multipart upload for those static attachments (stored under the user's subdir)
+// Reject uploads whose extension is not on the allow-list. The on-disk name is
+// already sanitised by the filename callback, but this stops a renamed .html /
+// .svg from being stored at all (defense-in-depth against stored XSS via inline
+// serving) and keeps the stored MIME trustworthy.
+const ATTACHMENT_FILTER = (req, file, cb) => {
+  const ext = path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase();
+  const ok = /^\.(pdf|png|jpe?g|gif|webp|docx?|rtf|odt|ods|txt|csv|xlsx?)$/.test(ext);
+  cb(ok ? null : new Error('Dateityp nicht erlaubt'), ok);
+};
+
 const uploadBasisAnhang = multer({
   storage: multer.diskStorage({
     destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, userStorageDirForReq(basisAnhaengeDir, req)),
@@ -301,6 +403,7 @@ const uploadBasisAnhang = multer({
     },
   }),
   limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 15 MB
+  fileFilter: ATTACHMENT_FILTER,
 }).single('datei');
 
 // Directory for private attachments the user keeps alongside the internal
@@ -319,6 +422,7 @@ const uploadInterneAnhang = multer({
     },
   }),
   limits: { fileSize: 15 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 15 MB
+  fileFilter: ATTACHMENT_FILTER,
 }).single('datei');
 
 // Directory + uploader for the applicant's signature image (used in the letter)
@@ -329,13 +433,17 @@ if (!fs.existsSync(signaturDir)) {
 const uploadSignatur = multer({
   storage: multer.diskStorage({
     destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, userStorageDirForReq(signaturDir, req)),
+    // Derive the extension from the validated MIME, not the user-supplied name,
+    // so a "x.png"-named .html can never land on disk as signatur_*.html.
     filename: (req, file, cb) => {
-      const ext = (path.extname(file.originalname) || '.png').toLowerCase();
+      const ext = /jpe?g/i.test(file.mimetype) ? '.jpg' : '.png';
       cb(null, `signatur_${Date.now()}${ext}`);
     },
   }),
   limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 MB
-  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, /^image\/(png|jpe?g)$/.test(file.mimetype)),
+  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => cb(null,
+    /^image\/(png|jpe?g)$/.test(file.mimetype)
+    && /^\.(png|jpe?g)$/.test(path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase())),
 }).single('signatur');
 
 // The single stored signature file, if any (in the current user's subdir).
@@ -373,12 +481,14 @@ const uploadFoto = multer({
   storage: multer.diskStorage({
     destination: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, userStorageDirForReq(fotoDir, req)),
     filename: (req, file, cb) => {
-      const ext = (path.extname(file.originalname) || '.png').toLowerCase();
+      const ext = /jpe?g/i.test(file.mimetype) ? '.jpg' : '.png';
       cb(null, `foto_${Date.now()}${ext}`);
     },
   }),
   limits: { fileSize: 5 * 1024 * 1024 }, // 5 MB
-  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => cb(null, /^image\/(png|jpe?g)$/.test(file.mimetype)),
+  fileFilter: (req, file, cb) => cb(null,
+    /^image\/(png|jpe?g)$/.test(file.mimetype)
+    && /^\.(png|jpe?g)$/.test(path.extname(file.originalname).toLowerCase())),
 }).single('foto');
 
 // The single stored photo file, if any (in the current user's subdir).
@@ -421,6 +531,92 @@ function sanitizeInput(input) {
     .replace(/'/g, '&#39;');
 }
 
+// --- File / path safety helpers -----------------------------------------
+// Strip a stored/display filename down to a single safe segment: no path
+// separators, no traversal, only [A-Za-z0-9._-]. multer already sanitises the
+// on-disk name, but display names (basis_anhaenge.dateiname) are stored raw and
+// were later re-used to build a path — which let a crafted name escape its dir.
+function safeFilename(name) {
+  return String(name == null ? 'datei' : name)
+    .replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9._-]/g, '_')
+    .replace(/^\.+/, '')      // no leading dots
+    .slice(0, 200) || 'datei';
+}
+
+// Sanitise a *display* filename for the Content-Disposition header: keep
+// unicode (umlauts etc.) but strip control chars / quotes / backslashes that
+// could inject or break an HTTP header. Used for download names shown to the
+// user — never for building an on-disk path (use safeFilename / containedPath).
+function displayFilename(name) {
+  return String(name == null ? 'datei' : name)
+    .replace(/[\x00-\x1f"\r\n\\]/g, '_')
+    .replace(/^\.+/, '')
+    .slice(0, 200) || 'datei';
+}
+
+// Resolve a stored relative path inside a user's base directory and assert the
+// result actually stays inside it (defense-in-depth against stored traversal).
+// Returns the absolute path, or null if it would escape `base`.
+function containedPath(base, rel) {
+  const root = path.resolve(base);
+  const abs = path.resolve(root, String(rel == null ? '' : rel));
+  if (abs !== root && !abs.startsWith(root + path.sep)) return null;
+  return abs;
+}
+
+// Only allow redirect targets that are same-origin relative paths, so a crafted
+// `back=https://evil.com` cannot bounce the user to an attacker site.
+function safeRedirect(target) {
+  const t = String(target == null ? '' : target).trim();
+  if (!t || t.startsWith('//') || t.startsWith('\\/')) return '/';
+  if (!/^[/?#]/.test(t)) return '/';
+  return t;
+}
+
+// --- SSRF guard for user-configured external hosts -----------------------
+// Block addresses that would let a user point the server at cloud metadata /
+// link-local services (the high-severity SSRF: stealing the instance's cloud
+// credentials). Loopback and private ranges stay allowed on purpose: the app
+// explicitly supports a local Ollama / CalDAV on the same host or LAN.
+function isBlockedSsrfIp(ip) {
+  if (!ip) return true;
+  const m = ip.split('.');
+  if (m.length === 4 && m.every((x) => /^\d+$/.test(x))) {
+    const [a, b] = m.map(Number);
+    if (a === 0) return true;                 // 0.0.0.0/8
+    if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;   // link-local / cloud metadata
+  }
+  if (ip === '::' || ip === '0:0:0:0:0:0:0:0') return true;
+  if (/^fe80:/i.test(ip)) return true;         // IPv6 link-local
+  return false;
+}
+function resolveHost(host) {
+  return new Promise((resolve) => {
+    dns.lookup(host, { all: true }, (err, addrs) => {
+      if (err || !addrs || !addrs.length) return resolve([]);
+      resolve(addrs.map((a) => a.address));
+    });
+  });
+}
+async function assertSafeUrl(raw, { requireTls = false } = {}) {
+  let u;
+  try { u = new URL(String(raw)); } catch { throw new Error('Ungültige URL'); }
+  if (!/^https?:$/.test(u.protocol)) throw new Error('Nur http/https erlaubt');
+  if (requireTls && u.protocol !== 'https:') throw new Error('HTTPS erforderlich');
+  if (isBlockedSsrfIp(u.hostname)) throw new Error('Interne Adresse nicht erlaubt');
+  for (const ip of await resolveHost(u.hostname)) {
+    if (isBlockedSsrfIp(ip)) throw new Error('Interne Adresse nicht erlaubt');
+  }
+}
+async function assertSafeHost(raw) {
+  const h = String(raw || '').split(':')[0].trim();
+  if (!h) throw new Error('Host fehlt');
+  if (isBlockedSsrfIp(h)) throw new Error('Interne Adresse nicht erlaubt');
+  for (const ip of await resolveHost(h)) {
+    if (isBlockedSsrfIp(ip)) throw new Error('Interne Adresse nicht erlaubt');
+  }
+}
+
 // Promise wrapper for db operations
 function dbGet(sql, params = []) {
   return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
@@ -481,32 +677,51 @@ async function destroySession(token) {
   if (token) await dbRun('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token = ?', [token]).catch(() => {});
 }
 
-// Resolve the user a session token belongs to, or null. Touches last_seen.
+// Resolve the user a session token belongs to, or null. Touches last_seen and
+// enforces the server-side absolute session expiry: a cookie is only valid for
+// SESSION_MAX_AGE after the last activity, regardless of the client-side
+// maxAge (which a client can tamper with). Expired rows are deleted.
 async function loadSessionUser(token) {
   if (!token) return null;
   const row = await dbGet(
-    `SELECT u.id AS id, u.username AS username, u.is_admin AS is_admin
+    `SELECT u.id AS id, u.username AS username, u.is_admin AS is_admin,
+            s.created_at AS created_at, s.last_seen AS last_seen
        FROM sessions s JOIN users u ON u.id = s.user_id
       WHERE s.token = ?`,
     [token]
   );
   if (!row) return null;
+  const stamp = row.last_seen || row.created_at;     // 'YYYY-MM-DD HH:MM:SS' (UTC)
+  const last = new Date(stamp + 'Z');
+  if (isNaN(last.getTime()) || (Date.now() - last.getTime()) / 1000 > SESSION_MAX_AGE) {
+    await dbRun('DELETE FROM sessions WHERE token = ?', [token]).catch(() => {});
+    return null;
+  }
   await dbRun('UPDATE sessions SET last_seen = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE token = ?', [token]).catch(() => {});
   return { id: row.id, username: row.username, is_admin: !!row.is_admin };
 }
 
 // Find a user by username + password (login check). Returns the user object or null.
+// When the username is unknown we still run a dummy scrypt verify against a fixed
+// hash, so a missing user takes the same time as a wrong password (no user
+// enumeration via timing).
 async function authenticate(username, plain) {
   const row = await dbGet('SELECT id, username, password_hash, is_admin FROM users WHERE username = ?', [username || '']);
-  if (!row) return null;
+  if (!row) {
-  if (!password.verify(plain || '', row.password_hash)) return null;
+    await password.verify(plain || '', password.DUMMY_HASH);
+    return null;
+  }
+  if (!(await password.verify(plain || '', row.password_hash))) return null;
   return { id: row.id, username: row.username, is_admin: !!row.is_admin };
 }
 
-// Set/clear the session cookie on a response.
+// Set/clear the session cookie on a response. The Secure flag is set whenever
+// the request arrived over TLS (Caddy terminates it; trust proxy lets us see
+// that via req.secure), so the cookie is never leaked over plain HTTP.
 function setSessionCookie(res, token) {
+  const secure = !!(res.req && res.req.secure);
   res.cookie(SESSION_COOKIE, token, {
-    httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax', path: '/', maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE * 1000,
+    httpOnly: true, sameSite: 'lax', path: '/', maxAge: SESSION_MAX_AGE * 1000, secure,
   });
 }
 function clearSessionCookie(res) {
@@ -879,11 +1094,14 @@ async function runGeneration(bewerbungId, options = {}) {
 
     let seq = 0;
     const storeAnhang = async (name, filename, mime, buffer) => {
-      const stored = `${bewerbungId}_${Date.now()}_${seq++}_${filename}`;
+      // Sanitise the filename segment so a stored ba.dateiname like '../x' can
+      // never escape the user's anhaenge directory via the on-disk path.
+      const safe = safeFilename(filename);
+      const stored = `${bewerbungId}_${Date.now()}_${seq++}_${safe}`;
       fs.writeFileSync(path.join(userStorageDir(anhaengeDir), stored), buffer);
       await dbRun(
         'INSERT INTO anhaenge (user_id, bewerbung_id, name, dateiname, mime, pfad) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)',
-        [U, bewerbungId, name, filename, mime, stored]
+        [U, bewerbungId, name, safe, mime, stored]
       );
     };
 
@@ -894,8 +1112,8 @@ async function runGeneration(bewerbungId, options = {}) {
 
     // Selected extra attachments (e.g. Zeugnisse) — copied as-is
     for (const ba of selectedAnhaenge) {
-      const src = path.join(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), ba.pfad);
+      const src = containedPath(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), ba.pfad);
-      if (!fs.existsSync(src)) continue;
+      if (!src || !fs.existsSync(src)) continue;
       await storeAnhang(ba.name || ba.dateiname, ba.dateiname, ba.mime || 'application/octet-stream', fs.readFileSync(src));
     }
 
@@ -1755,7 +1973,10 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       // Remove private attachments belonging to the internal notes.
       const interne = await dbAll('SELECT pfad FROM interne_anhaenge WHERE bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [id, uid()]);
       const intDir = userStorageDir(interneAnhaengeDir);
-      interne.forEach((a) => fs.promises.unlink(path.join(intDir, a.pfad)).catch(() => {}));
+      interne.forEach((a) => {
+        const fp = containedPath(intDir, a.pfad);
+        if (fp) fs.promises.unlink(fp).catch(() => {});
+      });
       await dbRun('DELETE FROM interne_anhaenge WHERE bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [id, uid()]);
       await dbRun('DELETE FROM bewerbungen WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [id, uid()]);
 
@@ -1971,8 +2192,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       for (const aid of anhangIds) {
         const a = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [aid, id, U]);
         if (!a) continue;
-        const p = path.join(anhaengeUserDir, a.pfad);
+        const p = containedPath(anhaengeUserDir, a.pfad);
-        if (!fs.existsSync(p)) continue;
+        if (!p || !fs.existsSync(p)) continue;
         attachments.push({ filename: a.dateiname, path: p, contentType: a.mime || undefined });
         attNames.push(a.dateiname);
       }
@@ -1985,8 +2206,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       for (const bid of basisAnlageIds) {
         const ba = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM basis_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [bid, U]);
         if (!ba) continue;
-        const p = path.join(basisUserDir, ba.pfad);
+        const p = containedPath(basisUserDir, ba.pfad);
-        if (!fs.existsSync(p)) continue;
+        if (!p || !fs.existsSync(p)) continue;
         attachments.push({ filename: ba.dateiname, path: p, contentType: ba.mime || undefined });
         attNames.push(ba.dateiname);
       }
@@ -2066,7 +2287,7 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
 
   // Manually trigger an IMAP fetch of new replies, then return to the referring page.
   app.post('/email/fetch', async (req, res) => {
-    const back = req.body.back || req.get('referer') || '/';
+    const back = safeRedirect(req.body.back || req.get('referer') || '/');
     try {
       await pollInbox();
     } catch (e) { /* errors are logged inside pollInbox */ }
@@ -2078,11 +2299,11 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
     try {
       const a = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM email_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [req.params.id, uid()]);
       if (!a) return res.status(404).send('Anhang nicht gefunden');
-      const p = path.join(userStorageDir(emailAnhaengeDir), a.pfad);
+      const p = containedPath(userStorageDir(emailAnhaengeDir), a.pfad);
-      if (!fs.existsSync(p)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
+      if (!p || !fs.existsSync(p)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
       // inline=1 opens viewable files (PDF/image) in the browser tab instead of forcing a download.
       if (req.query.inline === '1') return serveInline(res, p, a.name || a.pfad, a.mime);
-      res.download(p, a.name || a.pfad);
+      res.download(p, displayFilename(a.name || a.pfad));
     } catch (error) {
       console.error('Error downloading e-mail attachment:', error);
       res.status(500).send('Serverfehler');
@@ -2164,7 +2385,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       const atts = await dbAll('SELECT pfad FROM email_anhaenge WHERE email_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [emailId, uid()]);
       const attDir = userStorageDir(emailAnhaengeDir);
       for (const a of atts) {
-        fs.promises.unlink(path.join(attDir, a.pfad)).catch(() => {});
+        const fp = containedPath(attDir, a.pfad);
+        if (fp) fs.promises.unlink(fp).catch(() => {});
       }
       await dbRun('DELETE FROM email_anhaenge WHERE email_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [emailId, uid()]);
       await dbRun('DELETE FROM emails WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [emailId, uid()]);
@@ -2598,9 +2820,9 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
     try {
       const a = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM basis_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [req.params.id, uid()]);
       if (!a) return res.status(404).send('Anlage nicht gefunden');
-      const filePath = path.join(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), a.pfad);
+      const filePath = containedPath(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), a.pfad);
-      if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
+      if (!filePath || !fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
-      res.download(filePath, a.dateiname);
+      res.download(filePath, displayFilename(a.dateiname));
     } catch (error) {
       console.error('Error downloading attachment:', error);
       res.status(500).send('Serverfehler');
@@ -2612,7 +2834,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
     try {
       const a = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM basis_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [req.params.id, uid()]);
       if (a) {
-        fs.promises.unlink(path.join(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), a.pfad)).catch(() => {});
+        const fp = containedPath(userStorageDir(basisAnhaengeDir), a.pfad);
+        if (fp) fs.promises.unlink(fp).catch(() => {});
         await dbRun('DELETE FROM basis_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [req.params.id, uid()]);
       }
       res.redirect('/vorlagen');
@@ -2703,11 +2926,11 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
     try {
       const anhang = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [req.params.id, uid()]);
       if (!anhang) return res.status(404).send('Anhang nicht gefunden');
-      const filePath = path.join(userStorageDir(anhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
+      const filePath = containedPath(userStorageDir(anhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
-      if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
+      if (!filePath || !fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
       // inline=1 opens viewable files (PDF/image) in the browser tab instead of forcing a download.
       if (req.query.inline === '1') return serveInline(res, filePath, anhang.dateiname, anhang.mime);
-      res.download(filePath, anhang.dateiname);
+      res.download(filePath, displayFilename(anhang.dateiname));
     } catch (error) {
       console.error('Error downloading attachment:', error);
       res.status(500).send('Serverfehler');
@@ -2720,8 +2943,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       const { id, anhangId } = req.params;
       const anhang = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [anhangId, id, uid()]);
       if (anhang) {
-        const filePath = path.join(userStorageDir(anhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
+        const filePath = containedPath(userStorageDir(anhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
-        fs.promises.unlink(filePath).catch(() => {});
+        if (filePath) fs.promises.unlink(filePath).catch(() => {});
         await dbRun('DELETE FROM anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [anhangId, uid()]);
       }
       res.redirect('/bewerbung/' + id);
@@ -2766,10 +2989,10 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       const { id, anhangId } = req.params;
       const anhang = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM interne_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [anhangId, id, uid()]);
       if (!anhang) return res.status(404).send('Anhang nicht gefunden');
-      const filePath = path.join(userStorageDir(interneAnhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
+      const filePath = containedPath(userStorageDir(interneAnhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
-      if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
+      if (!filePath || !fs.existsSync(filePath)) return res.status(404).send('Datei nicht gefunden');
       if (req.query.inline === '1') return serveInline(res, filePath, anhang.dateiname, anhang.mime);
-      res.download(filePath, anhang.dateiname);
+      res.download(filePath, displayFilename(anhang.dateiname));
     } catch (error) {
       console.error('Error downloading internal attachment:', error);
       res.status(500).send('Serverfehler');
@@ -2782,7 +3005,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       const { id, anhangId } = req.params;
       const anhang = await dbGet('SELECT * FROM interne_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [anhangId, id, uid()]);
       if (anhang) {
-        fs.promises.unlink(path.join(userStorageDir(interneAnhaengeDir), anhang.pfad)).catch(() => {});
+        const fp = containedPath(userStorageDir(interneAnhaengeDir), anhang.pfad);
+        if (fp) fs.promises.unlink(fp).catch(() => {});
         await dbRun('DELETE FROM interne_anhaenge WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?', [anhangId, uid()]);
       }
       res.redirect('/bewerbung/' + id);
@@ -2809,7 +3033,8 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
       const anhaengeUserDir = userStorageDir(anhaengeDir);
       const alte = await dbAll('SELECT * FROM anhaenge WHERE bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [id, U]);
       for (const a of alte) {
-        fs.promises.unlink(path.join(anhaengeUserDir, a.pfad)).catch(() => {});
+        const fp = containedPath(anhaengeUserDir, a.pfad);
+        if (fp) fs.promises.unlink(fp).catch(() => {});
       }
       await dbRun('DELETE FROM anhaenge WHERE bewerbung_id = ? AND user_id = ?', [id, U]);
       await dbRun("UPDATE bewerbungen SET generierung_status = 'ausstehend', generierung_fehler = NULL WHERE id = ? AND user_id = ?", [id, U]);
@@ -3103,6 +3328,19 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
         }
       }
 
+      // SSRF guard: the user can configure external hosts the server will call
+      // (Ollama, CalDAV, mail). Validate them against a metadata/link-local
+      // blocklist so a user cannot point the server at a cloud metadata endpoint
+      // to exfiltrate instance credentials. Localhost / LAN stays allowed on
+      // purpose (the app supports a local Ollama or on-prem CalDAV).
+      try {
+        if ((werte.OLLAMA_HOST || '').trim()) await assertSafeUrl(werte.OLLAMA_HOST.trim());
+        if ((werte.CALDAV_URL || '').trim()) await assertSafeUrl(werte.CALDAV_URL.trim());
+        if ((werte.MAIL_HOST || '').trim()) await assertSafeHost(werte.MAIL_HOST.trim());
+      } catch (vErr) {
+        return res.status(400).send('Einstellung abgelehnt: ' + (vErr.message || 'ungültiger Host'));
+      }
+
       await config.saveAll(werte);
       res.redirect('/einstellungen');
     } catch (error) {
@@ -3740,6 +3978,16 @@ initializeDatabase().then(async () => {
   setTimeout(() => { refreshCaldavAllUsers().catch(() => {}); }, 10000); // initial sync after boot
   setInterval(() => { refreshCaldavAllUsers().catch(() => {}); }, calPoll); // periodic reconcile
 
+  // Global error handler: never leak internals. API/AJAX callers get JSON, everyone
+  // else gets a plain 500. Logged server-side with the stack for debugging.
+  app.use((err, req, res, next) => { // eslint-disable-line no-unused-vars
+    if (res.headersSent) return next(err);
+    console.error('Unhandled error:', err);
+    const wantsJson = (req.get('accept') || '').includes('application/json') || req.path.startsWith('/api/') || req.xhr;
+    if (wantsJson) return res.status(500).json({ error: 'Serverfehler' });
+    res.status(500).send('Serverfehler');
+  });
+
   // Handle 404
   app.use((req, res) => {
     res.status(404).send('Seite nicht gefunden');

views/bewerbung.ejs

@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@
                     </summary>
                     <div class="px-4 pb-4">
                         <% if (application.quelle_url) { %>
-                            <a href="<%= application.quelle_url %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener"
+                            <a href="<%= safeUrl(application.quelle_url) %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener"
                                class="inline-block mb-3 text-sm text-blue-600 dark:text-blue-400 hover:underline break-all"><%= application.quelle_url %></a>
                         <% } %>
                         <p class="whitespace-pre-wrap break-words text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300"><%= application.stellenbeschreibung %></p>
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@
                                 <p class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-800 dark:text-gray-100 mb-1"><%= e.subject || '(kein Betreff)' %></p>
                                 <% if (e.display_srcdoc) { %>
                                     <iframe class="email-html-frame w-full border border-gray-200 dark:border-gray-600 rounded bg-white" style="height:6rem"
-                                        sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"
+                                        sandbox="allow-same-origin" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"
                                         srcdoc="<%= e.display_srcdoc %>"></iframe>
                                 <% } else { %>
                                     <p class="whitespace-pre-wrap break-words text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300"><%= e.body_text || '' %></p>
@@ -828,8 +828,9 @@
             });
 
             // Size a sandboxed e-mail iframe to its content height. The sandbox
-            // enables allow-same-origin (but not allow-scripts), so scripts in the
+            // keeps allow-same-origin (so we can read contentDocument to measure)
-            // mail never run, yet we can still measure the rendered document.
+            // but enables no scripts, no forms and no popups, so mail content can
+            // neither execute nor escape the frame.
             function fitFrame(f) {
                 try {
                     const doc = f.contentDocument || (f.contentWindow && f.contentWindow.document);

views/jobangebote.ejs

@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@
                                         <% } %>
                                     <% } %>
                                     <% if (j.quelle_url) { %>
-                                        <a href="<%= j.quelle_url %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"
+                                        <a href="<%= safeUrl(j.quelle_url) %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"
                                            class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 text-xs text-blue-600 dark:text-blue-400 hover:underline mt-2 break-all">
                                             <svg class="w-3.5 h-3.5 shrink-0" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M10 6H6a2 2 0 00-2 2v10a2 2 0 002 2h10a2 2 0 002-2v-4M14 4h6m0 0v6m0-6L10 14"></path></svg>
                                             <span class="truncate"><%= j.quelle_url %></span>

views/jobangebote_uebernommen.ejs

@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
                                         </p>
                                     <% } %>
                                     <% if (j.quelle_url) { %>
-                                        <a href="<%= j.quelle_url %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"
+                                        <a href="<%= safeUrl(j.quelle_url) %>" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer"
                                            class="inline-flex items-center gap-1 text-xs text-blue-600 dark:text-blue-400 hover:underline mt-2 break-all">
                                             <svg class="w-3.5 h-3.5 shrink-0" fill="none" stroke="currentColor" viewBox="0 0 24 24"><path stroke-linecap="round" stroke-linejoin="round" stroke-width="2" d="M10 6H6a2 2 0 00-2 2v10a2 2 0 002 2h10a2 2 0 002-2v-4M14 4h6m0 0v6m0-6L10 14"></path></svg>
                                             <span class="truncate"><%= j.quelle_url %></span>

views/postfach.ejs

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
                                 <p class="text-sm font-medium text-gray-800 dark:text-gray-100 mb-1"><%= e.subject || '(kein Betreff)' %></p>
                                 <% if (e.display_srcdoc) { %>
                                     <iframe class="email-html-frame w-full border border-gray-200 dark:border-gray-600 rounded bg-white" style="height:6rem"
-                                        sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-popups allow-popups-to-escape-sandbox" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"
+                                        sandbox="allow-same-origin" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"
                                         srcdoc="<%= e.display_srcdoc %>"></iframe>
                                 <% } else { %>
                                     <p class="email-body whitespace-pre-wrap break-words text-sm leading-relaxed text-gray-700 dark:text-gray-300 max-h-40 overflow-hidden"><%= e.body_text || '' %></p>